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It is with great pleasure that I share
CARGC Paper 13, “Toward a Cultural
Framework of Internet Governance:
Russia’s Great Power Identity and the
Quest for a Multipolar Digital Order”
by Stanislav Budnitsky. Stanislav joined
CARGC as a 2018-2020 Postdoctoral
Fellow from Carleton University in
Ottawa, Canada where he received his
PhD from the School of Journalism
and Communication in 2018. A
graduate of Moscow’s National
Research University, Stanislav has held
fellowships with the Summer Media
Policy Institute at Oxford University,
the Berkman Klein Center for Internet
and Society at Harvard University, and
the Stanford US-Russia Forum. Prior
to graduate studies, he worked as a
media producer and writer in Russia.
CARGC Paper 13 makes an important
and timely contribution to current
debates about Russia’s approach
to internet governance. It proposes
the term of digital multipolarity to
re-think Russia’s global internet
governance policies away from the
often reductionist equation of Russia’s
discourse of digital sovereignty with
Putin’s authoritarian regime. Instead,
Stanislav’s paper invites us to consider
the historical continuities in Russia’s
strategic pursuit of multipolarity. A
close reading and intertextual analysis
of Russia’s internet discourse starting
in the mid-1990s during Boris Yeltsin’s
first term highlights how multipolarity
as a priority in global internet
governance pre-dates the recent
nationalist turn in Russian politics. As
CARGC Paper 13 shows, what is often

understood as the Primakov doctrine
– a strategic pursuit of multipolar
internet governance through the
United Nations system – can in fact
be traced to Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure
as Russia’s first Foreign Minister in the
early 1990s, a time of rapid economic
liberalization and market reforms. By
making central questions of national
sovereignty to our understanding of
the digital, CARGC Paper 13 reflects
the work of our current research
group on Critical Digital Sovereignties
(2013 – 2023), a diverse group of
global media scholars examining
the changing meanings, ethics, and
practices of sovereignty in the digital
age.
CARGC Paper 13 offers an innovative
analytical lens for making sense of
Russia’s internet governance agenda
by foregrounding the cultural logics
that underpin its strategic approach.
This cultural approach foregrounds
the historical trope of Russia as a
great power to explain Russian elites’
rejection of US-led unipolarity. It
complicates dominant narratives by
tracing Russia’s vision of multipolarity
to the early eighteenth century and
anxieties about global recognition
under Peter the Great’s reign.
Methodologically, CARGC Paper
13 shows how analytically centering
cultural factors such as Russia’s
great power identity generates more
nuanced understandings of the logics
and rhetoric at play in states’ internet
governance normative visions. This
provides an interesting blueprint for
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future internet governance research
more attuned to cultural and sociohistorical dimensions of digital policy.
This past year, our research group
on Critical Digital Sovereignties has
been in full swing. On October 3,
2019, we held a daylong workshop
at our headquarters in Philadelphia
to explore the question “What is
Digital Sovereignty?” We invited
scholars from Europe, Africa, and
the US to reimagine sovereignty in
and with the digital. Topics ranged
from biometric data rights in India,
the symbolism of satellite dishes for
the Islamic State, Grindr and military
surveillance in China, alternative
internet infrastructures in Indigenous
communities in the US, Mexico,
and the Gaza Strip. Participants
submitted images, videos, or sound
files along with their papers. This

helped foreground the aural and visual
dimensions of how digital sovereignty
is felt, experienced, circulated, and
contested across various contexts. As
an output of the workshop, CARGC
Press published a collaborative
digital publication using the opensource platform Scalar. This reflects
the group’s focus on producing
exciting research on the digital and
desire to mobilize innovative digital
methodologies and tools for doing
so. The Scalar publication can be
viewed at https://os.pennds.org/
digitaldominion/critical-digitalsovereignties-/index or accessed from
our website. I encourage you to check
it out and explore sovereignty in the
digital age from multiple angles, scales,
locations, and perspectives. A perfect
companion to CARGC Paper 13!

Marwan M. Kraidy

Professor of Communication
The Anthony Shadid Chair in Global
Media, Politics & Culture
Associate Dean for Administration
Director, Center for Advanced
Research in Global Communication
(CARGC)

@MKraidy
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Toward a Cultural Framework of Internet
Governance: Russia’s Great Power Identity
and the Quest for a Multipolar Digital Order
STANISLAV
BUDNITSKY

CARGC Postdoctoral
Fellow, Annenberg
School for
Communication,
University of
Pennsylvania

This CARGC Paper
considers the cultural logics
underlying Russia’s global
internet governance agenda.
It argues that to understand
Russia’s digital vision in the
early twenty-first century and,
by extension, the dynamics
of global internet politics
writ large, scholars must
incorporate Russia’s historic
self-identification as a great
power into their analyses.

INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, Russia has promoted the primacy of national governments and
intergovernmental organizations in managing the global internet.1 On May 1, 2019, in
a recent move toward Russia’s state-based internet governance vision, Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed amendments to two federal laws, entitled On Communication and
On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Security, establishing an autonomous
internet infrastructure within Russia’s territory. The Sovereign Internet Law, as the
initiative came to be known, prescribes duplicating some of the global internet’s critical
infrastructures, vastly expanding the state’s authorities over the internet, and ultimately
allowing the Russian government to operate a national internet segment independent of the
global network (Epifanova 2020). Russian supporters of the Sovereign Internet Law have
framed it expressly in terms of challenging the Western-dominated global digital order. The
bill’s sponsors in the State Duma cited the “aggressive” 2018 US Cybersecurity Strategy,
which identified Russia as one of the US’ key adversaries (alongside North Korea and Iran),
as evidence of the need for technological self-sufficiency in a global digital system (Klishas,
Bokova and Lugovoy 2018). In late December, nearly two months after the law went into
effect, the Russian president at his annual meeting with the press defended the law against
widespread domestic and international criticism that claimed it encroached on users’
human rights and sought to isolate Russia from the world. Putin argued, “[a] free internet
and a sovereign internet are two concepts that are not mutually exclusive,” asserting that the
law’s only goal was “to prevent the negative consequences of Russia’s possible disconnection
from the global network, which is largely governed from abroad” (Putin 2019b; added emphasis).2
This CARGC Paper considers the cultural logics underlying Russia’s global internet
governance agenda. It argues that to understand Russia’s digital vision in the early twentyfirst century and, by extension, the dynamics of global internet politics writ large, scholars
must incorporate Russia’s historic self-identification as a great power into their analyses. In
the post-Cold War era, Russian political elites across the ideological spectrum have drawn
on the cultural repertoire of Russia as a great power to construct the state’s overarching
geopolitical interest in reestablishing Russia’s full participation in global governance.
Russia’s geopolitical desire to secure recognition as a great power with an inherent right
to co-manage the international system hinges on the country’s belief that the unipolar
1 I would like to thank Clovis Bergere, Marina Krikorian, Fernanda Rosa, Britt Tevis, and Melissa Aronczyk for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 I rely on official translations of Russian-language statements into English where such documents are available;
in all other cases, translations are mine.
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US-led liberal order, which emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, must be replaced
with a multipolar order, in which multiple world powers negotiate the course of global
developments. The framework of multipolarity has dominated Russia’s diplomatic discourse
since the mid-1990s, promoting the notion of state sovereignty as full dominion of national
governments in domestic affairs, respect for the diversity of the world’s cultural and political
systems, and global governance conducted through international law and multilateral
intergovernmental organizations, primarily the UN Security Council. Russia views these
pillars of multipolarity as challenging US-led liberal internationalism, which violates
principles of national sovereignty and neglects global cultural and political diversity by
imposing its will upon other societies.
The framework of multipolarity came to the fore of Russia’s worldview concurrently with
the emergence of the Russian internet governance agenda in the second half the 1990s.
Since then, the quest for multipolarity has underlain the normative principles and rhetoric
of Russia’s pursuit for a multipolar digital order. For this reason, I use digital multipolarity to
refer to the condition of a multipolar digital order that Russia works to instill and digital
multipolarism to indicate Russia’s concerted agenda of advancing this vision that encompasses
rhetoric, institutions, and initiatives meant to challenge the US-led digital unipolarity. As
in other realms, a digital multipolarism narrative promotes the normative tropes of the
primacy of state sovereignty over national internet segments, the need to diversify global
digital governance and markets monopolized by the United States, and of the primacy of
state-based intergovernmental venues in managing the global internet.

By focusing on Russia’s
internet governance
policymaking predating
Vladimir Putin’s presidency
in 2000, this paper offers
a corrective to the dominant
understanding of Russia’s
internet agenda solely as
the function of Putin-era
political authoritarianism
and cultural illiberalism.

This paper illuminates how Russia’s self-understanding as a great power and its multipolar
vision have shaped its internet governance discourse by examining Russia’s early internet
initiatives in the 1990s. By focusing on Russia’s internet governance policymaking predating
Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 2000, this paper offers a corrective to the dominant
understanding of Russia’s internet agenda solely as the function of Putin-era political
authoritarianism and cultural illiberalism. Additionally, focusing on the cultural logics
of the nation’s approach to the global internet expands scholars’ analytical toolbox for
understanding the workings of global internet governance, since scholarship on the subject
has privileged materialist, legal, and science and technology studies (STS) approaches. By
contrast, this paper contributes to a nascent literature that takes ideational and cultural
factors seriously in the study of internet governance.

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
This CARGC Paper is part of a larger research project on the relationship between
nationalism and global internet governance. Using a socio-historical lens, the project
examines Russia’s approach to domestic and global internet governance in the context
of its official national identity trajectory across the three post-Soviet decades. The larger
study draws from intertextual analysis of Russia’s official identity and internet discourses;
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interviews with Russian media and internet experts and practitioners; and participant
observation conducted at high-profile foreign policy and internet-related gatherings in
Russia and four other countries. Its methods and findings underlie the following discussion,
even as the present study does not explicitly incorporate ethnographic methods. To
illustrate this paper’s main proposition regarding cultural continuities of Russia’s digital
multipolarism rooted in its great power self-image, I analyze the text and the sociopolitical context surrounding one of Russia’s earliest internet governance initiatives:
the UN Resolution proposed in 1998, entitled Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (United Nations General Assembly
1999). I then show how the logics and language of this resolution have underlain Russia’s
internet governance agenda to this day.
This CARGC Paper proceeds in three steps. Part I contextualizes digital multipolarism
within the global internet governance debate between proponents and opponents of the
US-led digital order and reviews existing scholarly understandings of Russia’s internet
governance agenda. Part II situates Russia’s digital multipolarism in relation to its historic
great power identity, offering a cultural analysis of Russia’s internet governance agenda.
Part III illustrates how Russian officials have drawn on the ideational and discursive
framework of multipolarity in constructing Russia’s digital multipolarism through an
examination of Russia’s early internet governance initiatives in the 1990s. The conclusion
discusses the limitations of the prevailing non-cultural explanations of Russia’s internet
governance agenda.

RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNET
Russia’s pursuit of a multipolar digital order is one of the structuring forces of global
internet politics and thus must be understood in the context of geopolitical debates
about the global internet. Accordingly, this section introduces the emergence of internet
governance as a geopolitical domain and explains its central debate over which state or nonstate organizations should hold the ultimate authority to govern the global internet. Further,
the section situates Russia’s internet governance agenda within the clashing visions for the
global internet advanced by national governments. Lastly, it reviews prevalent scholarly
approaches to understanding Russia’s digital multipolarism.
Internet Governance: Emergence of a Geopolitical Domain
Global internet governance refers to the domain of global politics concerned with the
design and administration of the norms and rules governing the global internet (DeNardis
2014). Over the past two decades, internet governance ascended to the fore of global
communication policymaking and global affairs (Radu 2019). From the internet’s invention
in the 1970s under the auspices of the US government through its rapid popularization
and commercialization in the mid-1990s, governance of the internet’s critical infrastructure
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was performed by several US-based non-profit organizations. In 1997-98, as the
internet’s political-economic and security potential came to the fore, the Clinton White
House moved to secure the United States’ historic privilege over the internet. The US
administration fostered a governance model that preserved management of the internet’s
critical resources within existing and newly established US-based non-governmental
organizations, while precluding from its management intergovernmental bodies (Mueller
2002). The US government’s initiative introduced the central question of global internet
politics: should management of the global internet’s critical resources continue to be
controlled by unelected US-based bodies or should it be administered under the ambit of
an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations? Put another way, what
governing arrangement would allow states other than the US to share power over the global
internet’s techno-political configurations? While the central debate of internet governance
emerged at the close of the twentieth century, it was not until the first decade of the twentyfirst century that the central actors and institutions involved in this debate emerged on the
global stage.
In the 2000s, national governments became increasingly involved in managing their
domestic internet segments and advancing their foreign policies of the internet (Giacomello
2005; Goldsmith and Wu 2006, Chap. 5; Mueller 2010). The UN World Summit on
Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, brought together
highest-level officials in discussions over how and who ought to govern the global internet
for the first time, thereby elevating internet governance to unprecedented geopolitical
heights (Mueller 2010, Chap. 3). The summit cemented the issue of state versus nonstate-based governance of the internet as the core problematic of global internet politics,
exposing cleavages among varying national visions. The terms of this debate persist largely
unchanged to this day and are reviewed next.
National Agendas for the Global Internet
The United States as the digital hegemon works to preserve the existing internet governance
model, which critically relies upon US-based non-governmental organizations (Powers
and Jablonski 2015). A number of traditional and new US allies support this agenda (e.g.,
Canada, Estonia, and Ukraine). Most European states have traditionally argued for a
greater role in internet governance decision-making for national governments vis-à-vis
non-governmental institutions, while reaffirming the shared Euro-Atlantic values in order
to distance themselves from illiberal challengers to the US’ digital hegemony such as China
and Russia (Buttarelli 2014). Particularly after the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013
regarding the US unlawful global surveillance programs, European powers such as France
and Germany have been increasingly vocal in promoting the rhetoric of national and
European digital sovereignty and have been more assertive in challenging the digital status
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quo (e.g., French National Cybersecurity Agency 2016). At the UN Internet Governance
Forum in Paris in 2018, the French President Emmanuel Macron criticized what he called
the false binary structuring contemporary internet governance discourse: a choice between
the “Californian” model of undemocratic regulation by unelected private bodies and the
“Chinese” model of complete state control without meaningful participation of non-state
actors (Macron 2018). Macron proposed instead “a new multilateralism” that would bring
together state and non-state actors in establishing new rules for the global internet.
Russia and China are the most prominent opponents of the US-led system and proponents
of a multipolar digital order. Their counter-hegemonic narrative stresses the primacy of
Westphalian state sovereignty as the normative underlying principle for global internet
governance. This position holds that, as with preceding communication systems from the
telegraph to television, national governments and national laws should guide domestic
internet governance, while intergovernmental organizations and binding international laws
should regulate the global internet.
Since the late 2000s, advocates of state-based governance have developed collective and
individual institutions and initiatives that explicitly challenge the current digital order.
One early example of such a collective initiative is the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
International Information Security, signed in 2009 by members of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO; then consisting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan), and expressing commitment to the “internationalization of global internet
governance.” The Agreement alludes to the United States and other technologically developed
states when it names the “[u]se of dominant position[s] in the information space to the
detriment of the interests and security of other countries” as one of the key threats to
international informational security (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2009, 12). In a
sign of the recent institutionalization of the Russia-led digital multipolarism, since 2015,
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) communication ministers have gathered
annually, sometimes in conjunction with SCO members, to promote the internationalization
of internet governance and the global ICT market. At the 8th International IT Forum
held in Russia, which brought together BRICS and SCO members and their national
digital champions, the Russian Minister of Communication Nikolay Nikiforov (2012-2018)
lamented that the global IT market is “unfortunately, dominated essentially by one country
and a few companies.” As an alternative, he proposed, “in all spheres we should have
balance and diversification. Monopoly is bad. Monopoly in the information technologies is
a real threat to the digital sovereignty of our countries” (Nikiforov 2016).
Russia’s increasingly assertive global advancement of a multipolar digital order has received
ample attention from experts, who have generated several explanations of Russia’s position
and attendant policy initiatives. The next section reviews these explanations and then offers
a cultural framework for understanding Russia’s approach to the global internet.
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Scholarly Approaches to Russia’s Internet Governance Agenda
The dominant view of Russia’s global push for a state-based internet governance model
deems it an extension of domestic authoritarian politics and variously conceptualizes
it as “networked authoritarianism,” “digital authoritarianism,” and “Moscow’s spoiler
model” (Franke and Pallin 2012, 62-64; Kennedy 2013; Maréchal 2017; Morgus 2018a;
Mueller 2019, 8-10; O’Hara and Hall 2018; Polatin-Reuben and Wright 2014; Soldatov
and Borogan 2015, Chap. 11; Stadnik 2019). This school of thought views Russia’s policy
proposals as an effort to export its domestic authoritarian model in order to normalize the
Russian ruling elite’s political repressions and personal enrichment at home. By contrast,
Julian Nocetti, a leading observer of Russia’s internet politics, argues against viewing
internet governance debates and Russia’s approach to them specifically through the binary
lens of democratic versus authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging Russia’s opposition
to the US internet hegemony, Nocetti suggests that the conflict instead is taking place
“between long-established, cosmopolitan states and newer states that do not yet feel safe in
their sovereignty” (2015, 129). Nocetti places Russia’s origins in the moment of its formal
independence from the Soviet Union in December 1991, thereby determining Russia to
be a new state. As a newer nation-state not yet confident in its sovereignty, according to
Nocetti’s framework, Russia seeks to erect digital borders out of a sense of ontological
insecurity. Another common scholarly approach to conceptualizing Russia’s current
advocacy of state-based internet governance situates Russia’s internet agenda within the
political-economic rise of a cohort of states around the world, including but not limited
to BRICS, and their ensuing challenge to the US-led digital status quo (Ebert and Maurer
2013; Freedman and Wilkinson 2013; Rebello 2017; Winseck 2017; Zhao 2015). As middle
and major powers not aligned with the United States gain geopolitical weight, these writers
suggest, they seek to reshape the norms and infrastructures of the global internet: from
laying new submarine internet cables to putting forth collective internet policy initiatives.
Generally, existing analytical approaches to Russia’s internet governance vision do not
consider Russian national identity as a legible explanatory factor of its normative stance.
This neglect of the cultural lens in understanding the logics of Russian internet philosophy
is symptomatic of a broader omission in internet governance scholarship. In thinking about
the structuring dynamics of internet governance as a global domain, to date, scholars
have privileged the lenses of law, political economy, international relations, and science
and technology studies (e.g., Brousseau et al. 2012; Carr 2015; Kohl 2017; Musiani et al.
2016). Socio-cultural approaches to global internet governance have remained marginal,
particularly those employing a national identity lens (but see Kiggins 2012). To fill this
analytical gap, scholars must take into account cultural factors when conceptualizing
Russia’s approach to global internet politics.
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How national decision-making elites conceptualize the nation’s identity, drawing in this
process from the cultural reservoir available to their society at a given historical moment,
informs the state’s construction of its foreign policy interest and performance on the world
stage. As Erik Ringmar notes in his study of the relationship between national identity and
geopolitical action, “in order to answer a question regarding an interest we must first be able
to answer a question regarding who or what we are” (Ringmar 1996, 13). Russian ruling
elite’s answer to the question of who Russia is—a great power—has not fundamentally
changed since the early eighteenth century, despite dramatic changes to the country’s
political regime. The analytical approach I adopt to the relationship between Russia’s great
power identity and pursuit of digital multipolarity seeks to establish what has been referred
to as “constitutive causality” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 52). The lens of constitutive
causality “engages how humans conceive of their worlds, the language they use to describe
them, and other elements constituting that social world, which make possible or impossible
the interactions they pursue” rather than trying to establish the relationship between
cultural context and action “in terms of a more mechanistic causality” (Schwartz-Shea and
Yanow 2012, 52). The next section thereby situates Russia’s digital multipolarity narrative
in relation to its historic great power identity in order to illuminate the cultural context
informing Russia’s construction of its interest in the area of global internet governance.

DIGITAL MULTIPOLARISM AND GREAT POWER IDENTITY
Russia’s historic national identity as a great power, this paper contends, underlies its digital
multipolarism – a geopolitical agenda to replace the US-led internet governance system
with a state-based intergovernmental arrangement. This section unpacks what great power
identity means in contemporary Russian political imaginary. I first historicize Russia’s claims
to great power status over the past three centuries to illuminate why this cultural repertoire
was so readily available for the Russian post-Soviet policymaking elites to embrace as
the crux of independent Russia’s national project. I then explain why the concept of
multipolarity, in turn, is central to Russia’s self-understanding as a great power. Lastly, I
detail the tropes that form the ideational and discursive framework of multipolarism and by
extension of digital multipolarism.

Russia’s great power
identity has informed
the logics and discourse
of Russian official
nationalism and foreign
policy since the early
eighteenth century.

Russia’s great power identity has informed the logics and discourse of Russian official
nationalism and foreign policy since the early eighteenth century. Identity is an
intersubjective category and social actors, individuals and states alike, seek recognition of
their self-understanding from significant others (Bartelson 2016). Countries of Western
Europe and, since the twentieth century, the Euro-Atlantic world led by the United States
have historically played the role of Russia’s significant other, from whom Russian elites
sought recognition (Neumann 2016a; Tolz 2001, Chap. 3). Beginning in the late fifteenth
century and throughout the seventeenth century, Russian elites strove for recognition of
Russia as an equal European power (Neumann 2008a). Western royals, however, deemed
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Russia’s Eastern Orthodoxy and despotic governance to be culturally alien, leaving Russia
on the symbolic periphery of Europe until Peter the Great’s (1682-1725) full-fledged
campaign to attain great power status. Domestically, Peter attempted to Europeanize the
country’s cultural norms and administrative practices. Abroad, he asserted Russia’s place in
Europe through diplomacy and war. Following Russia’s defeat of Sweden, then a top-rated
power, in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), the newly created Russian Empire received
recognition as a key actor in the international system. Three decades later, during the Seven
Years’ War (1756-1763), the world’s major powers finally awarded Russia long-sought
recognition as an undisputed great power.
Russia affirmed its great power status during the so-called long nineteenth century, a period
between the French (1789) and Russian (1917) revolutions (Neumann 2008b). During
this time, Russia participated in the creation of the modern global telecommunication
order. It was one of the twenty founding states of the International Telegraph Union in
1865 and one of the twenty-nine founders of the International Radiotelegraph Union
in 1906 (the two organizations ultimately merged to become in 1947 the International
Telecommunication Union under the auspices of the UN). During the Soviet period (19221991), despite the ideological break with the Orthodox monarchy of the Russian Empire,
Russian rulers continued to seek Western recognition of its great power status (Ringmar
2002).
After the USSR’s dissolution, Russian political elites across the ideological spectrum were
primed to view great power status as Russia’s raison d’être (Clunan 2014; Lo 2002, 19-20).
Representatives of political factions, however, have held different visions of the sources of
Russia’s greatness. A leading scholar of Russian foreign policy Andrei Tsygankov (2016)
identifies three ideational strands among Russian foreign policymakers since at least the
sixteenth century: Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists. In the post-Soviet period,
Westernizers saw the source of Russia’s greatness in shared liberal-democratic values and
sought integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Westernizers’ influence on Russia’s
foreign policy was particularly strong during Boris Yeltsin’s first presidential term (19911996), although during this time Russia’s official stance increasingly slid toward centrist
statism. Statists, who range from liberal to conservative wings, equate greatness with a strong
state that can maintain domestic economic and political order and ensure security from
external threats. Statists are not inherently anti-Western but seek recognition of Russia’s
sovereignty as a prerequisite to pragmatic cooperation. The statist period began with the
term of Yevgeny Primakov as the Foreign Minister (1996-98) and Prime Minister (199899) and continued throughout much of Vladimir Putin’s rule until the early 2010s. Lastly,
Civilizationists emphasize Russia’s cultural distinctiveness and most assertively challenge
Western liberalism. Civilizational tropes began appearing in Russia’s official discourse
toward the late 2000s and became overt following the regime’s conservative turn of 201214.
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As in the previous epochs, in the post-Soviet period elite debates have been not so much
about whether Russia is a great power but, rather, what kind of great power it is or ought
to be in terms of its geopolitical orientation and sources of greatness. Acknowledging the
plurality of competing elite understandings of the essence of Russia’s great power identity,
Director of Moscow’s Carnegie Center Dmitri Trenin points out the ambiguities of
Russia’s great power identity discourse (Trenin 2011, 411-417; see also Morozov 2015, 59).
Nevertheless, Trenin suggests that Russian elites of varying ideological persuasions concur
upon the view that “strategic independence” is fundamental to Russia’s greatness (see also
Lo 2002, 57-61). According to Trenin, strategic independence for Russian elites implies that
Russia inherently enjoys the right to domestic sovereignty, free pursuit of interests abroad,
and full participation in global governance. Russia’s pursuit of strategic independence in
the post-bipolar international environment led to the emergence of multipolarity as the
central ideational and discursive framework of Russia’s foreign policy (Ambrosio 2005;
Chebankova 2017; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017; Silvius 2017). The notion of polarity
in international affairs originates in the US realist school of international relations theory
and refers to the relative distribution of material capacities, most crucially economic and
military, among one (unipolarity), two (bipolarity), or multiple (multipolarity) great powers
at any given historic moment (Keersmaeker 2017). Having borrowed the terminology of
polarity from the realist Western academic discourse, Russian officials employ multipolarity
as a normative proposition about the nature of Russian identity as a great power and the
post-Cold War international system, which, they argue, should be governed by several
centers of power, including Russia.

The foundational principles
and tropes of Russia’s
official multipolarity
discourse have remained
virtually unchanged since
the early-to-mid 1990s.
The basis of multipolarity,
as used in Russian official
discourse, is the sanctity of
Westphalian
state sovereignty.

The foundational principles and tropes of Russia’s official multipolarity discourse have
remained virtually unchanged since the early-to-mid 1990s. The basis of multipolarity,
as used in Russian official discourse, is the sanctity of Westphalian state sovereignty. The
sovereign has full authority over domestic conduct within its territory and full independence
from foreign interference. The tropes of “sovereignty” and “independence” refer to the
inalienable right of governments to pursue domestic and foreign policy they see fit. Putin
highlighted the existential significance of sovereignty for Russia at the Valdai Club meeting
in 2007: “[s]overeignty is […] something very precious today, something exclusive, you
could even say. Russia cannot exist without defending its sovereignty. Russia will either be
independent and sovereign or will most likely not exist at all” (Putin 2007). The principle of
sovereignty is then applied globally to suggest that the world is or ought to be comprised of
sovereign states free to conduct themselves domestically and internationally in accordance
with their respective cultural, social, and political beliefs and identities. The notion that
the world consists of multiple distinct sovereigns is conveyed with the trope of “diversity.”
Diversity is juxtaposed against the “hegemony” or “monopoly” of the US-led order,
even when the United States are not explicitly mentioned by name and referred to via
euphemisms like “one country” and “sole power.”
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Russia offers a two-pronged argument in favor of multipolarity. The first argument appeals
to moral categories by framing a multipolar world as more “democratic,” “equitable,” and
“just,” since it allegedly gives every sovereign people the right to live according to their
cultural beliefs and political ideologies. The second argument appeals to the purported
greater efficiency of a multipolar world in which the powerful unipole does not skew the
rules of the global economic competition and political deliberations. “International law”
and state-based “multilateral governance,” foremost the United Nations and its Security
Council, are proposed as the mechanisms through which the multipolar world
should function.
Russia’s multipolarity discourse has continuously relied on the same set of tropes but has
acquired an increasingly confrontational tone with the gradual shift in Russia’s identity
discourse toward greater illiberalism over the course of three post-Soviet decades (Neumann
2016b). Illustrative of the Kremlin’s ideational and rhetorical pivot toward anti-Westernism
in the 2010s, in his annual address to the upper house of the Russian parliament in
December 2017, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2004 – present) harshly blamed
Western powers for the ongoing crisis in Russia-West relations and chastised them for their
opposition to the emergence of the multipolar world:
We are convinced that the main reason for the current tension is the persistently
egocentric and cynical line taken by a number of countries, led by the United
States. Having come to believe in its own supremacy and infallibility, and having
become accustomed to thinking its opinions should be perceived as the ultimate
truth, the so-called “historical West” is trying to obstruct the natural process of the
development of a more just and democratic polycentric world order. Those who
dissent are subjected to a broad range of reprisals, unilateral coercive measures
and direct interference in their internal affairs (Lavrov 2017).
Russian officials have drawn on the ideational and discursive framework of multipolarity,
a core pillar of Russia’s great power identity, in constructing Russia’s counter-hegemonic
narrative of global internet governance. The next section examines the emergence of this
discourse in the 1990s.

THE ORIGINS OF DIGITAL MULTIPOLARISM
Yevgeny Primakov is widely considered to have made the pursuit of multipolarity the
central tenet of Russia’s foreign policy during his tenure as the second Foreign Minister in
1996-98 and Prime Minister in 1998-99 (Ambrosio 2005, 166; Lo 2015, 43-44; Makarychev
and Morozov 2011, 355; Silvius 2017, 82). During Primakov’s final years, but especially
after his passing in 2015 at the age of eighty-five, official Russian discourse mythologized
the figure of Primakov as the founding father of post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy. In late
October 2019, on the anniversary of Primakov’s ninetieth birthday, the unveiling of his life-
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size monument outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs definitively propelled Primakov to
the status of the progenitor of modern Russia’s foreign policy with multipolarism at its core.
In his remarks at the ceremony, Putin commended Primakov for having revived respect
for Russia in international diplomacy, suggesting that Primakov “had a strategic vision
and worked hard to promote the idea of multipolarity. In fact, it was Yevgeny Primakov
who clearly formulated the key principles of the modern world development. We see that
multipolarity is no longer a trend but a reality today” (Putin 2019a).

By making evident the
degree of ideational
continuity between twinned
discourses of great
power and multipolarity
from Kozyrev’s liberal
Atlanticism to Primakov’s
centrist statism, I challenge
analytical couplings of
Russia’s rejection of the
US digital hegemony with
authoritarian politics and
purported anti-Western
phobias of Putin’s regime.

While it was Primakov who first promoted multipolarism as a foreign policy doctrine,
he drew upon ideational and discursive foundations found in Boris Yeltsin’s first term
as president (1991-1996) and Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure as Russia’s first Foreign Minister
(1990-1996).3 To illuminate continuity between administrations, I trace Russia’s digital
multipolarity discourse through the first half of the 1990s, even as the internet reached
less than one percent of the population and internet geopolitics were nascent. By making
evident the degree of ideational continuity between twinned discourses of great power and
multipolarity from Kozyrev’s liberal Atlanticism to Primakov’s centrist statism, I challenge
analytical couplings of Russia’s rejection of the US digital hegemony with authoritarian
politics and purported anti-Western phobias of Putin’s regime.
Russia as a Normal Great Power: 1991-1996
Examining the essentially pre-internet years of the early 1990s is critical for understanding
the cultural logics of Russia’s approach to the global internet. The Russian government in
the first years after the demise of the Soviet Union enthusiastically pursued Euro-Atlantic
orientation toward cultural and institutional integration into the liberal West (Tsygankov
2016, Chap. 3). Russian leaders insisted, however, that the Euro-Atlantic integration would
not diminish the country’s great power status but enhance it by returning Russia to the
common civilizational path characterized by a liberal-democratic political system and
market economy. Andrey Kozyrev, writing in the US magazine Foreign Affairs a few months
after the Soviet Union’s demise, asserted that “Russia will not cease to be a great power. But
it will be a normal great power” (Kozyrev 1992). The trope of a nation’s return to normality
of the civilized Western world from the alleged abnormality of state socialism is one of the
central propositions of the so-called transition, a liberal teleological narrative suggesting that
societies necessarily move toward market liberalism, while any deviation from this path is a
temporary accident of history (Kennedy 2002). Kozyrev’s emphasis on Russia being a normal
great power, then, was meant to signal a qualitative shift in Russia’s great power self-image
toward that of a non-threatening equal partner of the West that was firmly on the way to
joining the family of liberal democracies.
3 Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (RSSR, then still part of the USSR) in June
1991 and continued serving as Russian president after the Soviet Union’s end and through his reelection for the
second term in 1996. Kozyrev was appointed Foreign Minister of the RSSR by the parliament in October 1990 and
likewise carried on in this role into Russia’s independence.
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Russian elites’ belief that as a great power Russia could not be subservient to the emergent
US-led unipolarity inspired Russia’s vision of multipolarity. Within the first two years of
Russia’s post-Soviet independence, the early naiveté of the Russian liberal foreign policy
decision-makers regarding Russia’s place in the West gave way to increasing skepticism
about the prospects of seamless integration. Kozyrev, still a convinced Atlanticist, wrote in
Foreign Affairs two years later to call upon Western audiences for “partnership in a multipolar
world” while explicitly denouncing the emerging US hegemony:
[T]he international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax Americana or any
other version of unipolar or bipolar dominance. The United States does not have
the capability to rule alone. Russia, while in a period of transitional difficulties,
retains the inherent characteristics of a great power (technology, resources,
weaponry). And other rising centers of influence strive for a greater role in world
affairs. The nature of modern international problems calls for solutions on a
multilateral level (Kozyrev 1994).
Russia’s great power identity and multipolarity vision was institutionalized in its first
Foreign Policy Concept developed during the peak of Russia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation
throughout 1992 and signed into law by Yeltsin in early 1993. The Concept exhibits
fervent commitment to a market economy and liberal democracy yet also asserts Russia’s
natural great power status and showcases multipolarism’s foundational normative tropes:
independence in foreign policy, opposition to unipolarity, and primacy of international law
and multilateral institutions in global governance. The Concept argues, “it is necessary to
firmly resist the USA’s possible relapses into a policy of imperial ambitions, or any attempt
to embark on a policy of turning the USA into a ‘sole superpower’” (Yeltsin 2005 [1993]).
At the same time, the Concept reaffirms Russia’s commitment to transition and portrays
the United States as Russia’s most favored significant other by suggesting, for instance, that
in US-Russia relations “[t]he top priority is to have America acknowledge Russia’s leading
role as the engine for market reform and guarantor of democratic transition within the
post-Soviet space.” The coexistence within a single discourse of the argument against US
hegemony and yearning for recognition of Russia’s liberal credentials by the US suggests
that Russia’s multipolarism is not inherently culturally illiberal and politically authoritarian,
as is often assumed from today’s analytical vantage point. Rather, opposition to the US
hegemony and advocacy of the UN-based multipolarity stems from Russia’s understanding
of itself as a great power with an inalienable right to co-manage the international system.
The West did not embrace Russia as an equal partner in global affairs during what was, by
far, Russia’s most pro-Western period in history. Consequently, by the end of Yeltsin’s first
term in 1996, official discourse of open-armed Atlanticism of the first post-Soviet years
graduated toward a more statist self-image and an understanding of Russia’s international
interests as laying in pragmatic cooperation with the West rather than attempts at ideational
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alignment. A few months before the presidential elections in the summer of 1996, Yeltsin
appointed then head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeny Primakov as
Foreign Minister.
Primakov Doctrine and the Emergence of Global Internet Politics: 19961999
Primakov during his terms as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister placed the notion
of multipolarity at the center of Russia’s foreign policy, what came to be known as
the Primakov Doctrine. In the second half of the 1990s, promotion of the idea of a
multipolar world became a central task of Russia’s foreign policy in its quest toward global
recognition of its great power status. While the Kremlin did not update the 1993 Foreign
Policy Concept during Primakov’s tenure, the framework of multipolarism was anchored
throughout political and policy discourse. For example, the 1997 National Security Concept
suggested that Russia’s interests “require active foreign policy aimed at strengthening
Russia’s positions as a great power – one of the influential centers in the emerging
multipolar world” (Yeltsin 2002 [1997], 55). On the global stage, Russia inaugurated
multipolarism with the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the
Establishment of a New International Order (Yeltsin and Zemin 1997).
Concurrent with the institutionalization of Russia’s multipolarism discourse, the global
politics of the internet were forming as a geopolitical domain with a distinct set of actors,
issues, and institutions (Braman 2004). The framework of multipolarity had underpinned
Russia’s approach to the global internet from the beginning of its participation in early
global internet governance politics. In 1998, Russia inaugurated the UN discussion on
security in the global informational space by submitting a two-page resolution, entitled
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,
to the General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 1999). The document draws
attention to the potential use of emerging scientific-technological innovations toward
improper ends and calls on UN member states to collectively respond to this inherent
challenge of the digital age. Since 1998, Russia has put forth the resolution nearly
every year.
The resolution has contributed
to institutionalization of
internet governance as a
domain of global affairs and,
in line with Russia’s digital
multipolarism agenda, to
the symbolic legitimization
of intergovernmental
organizations such as the
United Nations as venues
for internet governance
deliberations.

The resolution has contributed to institutionalization of internet governance as a domain
of global affairs and, in line with Russia’s digital multipolarism agenda, to the symbolic
legitimization of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations as venues
for internet governance deliberations. Since its introduction, the UN has published annual
collections of states’ replies to the resolution, which became a regular platform for states to
express their normative positions on international information security. Most significantly,
the resolution produced the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), a preeminent
intergovernmental forum for discussing international information security. GGE processes
are yearlong consultations among representatives of roughly one to two dozen states on the
norms of international information security. The overarching purpose of these face-to-face
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discussions is to enhance mutual understanding among policymakers and ultimately come
to an agreement on norms of state behavior in cyberspace that would be acceptable to all
governments involved in this process. The first four GGE processes (2004/05, 2009/10,
2012/13, 2014/15) produced three consensus reports (2010, 2013, 2015) that contributed
to building understanding among policymakers with contrasting normative stances, even
if they otherwise didn’t produce major tangible results. After a decade of gradual progress,
however, GGE imploded.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing crisis in Russia-West relations, the fifth GGE in
2016/17 exposed irreconcilable differences in countries’ normative approaches to the
foundational principles of internet governance. For example, in the 2017 annual collection
of states’ replies published by the UN Secretary-General, US ally Canada argued that
“[e]xisting international law is applicable to the use of information and communications
technology by States” (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2017, 7-9). Canada’s
proposition was counter to Russia’s long-standing insistence that new binding laws be
developed through intergovernmental organizations to regulate states’ use of ICT (an
approach that Russia’s digital multipolarism frames as a more democratic mechanism
of regulating global informational space since it would presumably involve all states). In
contrast with Canada, Cuba echoed Russia’s stance by arguing for the need “to establish
a legally binding international regulatory framework which is complementary to existing
international law but applies to information and communications technologies” (United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2017, 7-9). The 2016/17 GGE not only failed to
produce a new consensus report but led to a split into two parallel cybersecurity discussion
processes under the UN auspices: one initiated by the United States, another by Russia.
Since the resolution’s introduction in the late 1990s, it has come to play a major symbolic
role in Russian internet governance discourse. Russian officials have viewed the resolution
as one of the country’s most successful internet governance initiatives and have rhetorically
employed it to promote the image of Russia as an internet governance pioneer. The status
of a pioneer is meant to confer upon Russia a sense of historical credibility to spearhead the
reshaping of the global digital order. Russian representatives regularly invoke the resolution
as evidence of widespread international support for the Kremlin’s internet governance
agenda. In 2015, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (2012-2020) referenced it in his address
to the World Internet Conference in China. Medvedev sought to bolster the multilateral
internet governance model and criticize the US internet hegemony by noting that “support
for the resolution has become truly global” with “more than 80 states from all regions of the
world” acting as its “coauthors” (Medvedev 2015). In 2018, on the twentieth anniversary
of the original resolution, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release to
celebrate the adoption of the 2018 version of the resolution. The press release was used on
this occasion to bolster Russia’s internet governance stance by serving as a reminder that the
“issue of international security was placed on the UN’s agenda in 1998 at Russia’s initiative”
and boasting that again in 2018 the resolution was “supported by an overwhelming majority
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of states and co-authored by over 30 countries from different parts of the world” (Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The press release framed Russia’s resolution as advancing
an inherently more just multipolar order that would incorporate all countries into global
internet governance on an equal footing, not only those aligned with the liberal hegemon:
We are convinced that the era of “club” arrangements is over and that all
countries, regardless of their level of technological development, have a right to
take a direct part in talks on [international information security] at the UN and to
influence the decision-making process. Every vote counts and must be taken into
consideration. Only in this way can we create the basis for a fair and equal world
order in the digital sphere (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

By locating core pillars
of Russia’s digital
multipolarism in the
first post-Soviet decade,
I illuminate continuities
in Russia’s approach
to the global internet
in order to analytically
divorce Russia’s internet
governance agenda from
the logics of authoritarian
politics of the Putin-era...

Having situated the resolution in the history of global internet governance and in Russia’s
political imaginary, I now return to the discussion of the original resolution put forth in
1998. I analyze it as an early example of Russia’s digital multipolarism – a geopolitical
agenda aimed at challenging the purported US digital hegemony and establishing in its
place a digital order governed by multiple actors through intergovernmental organizations
such as the United Nations. In the rest of this section, I excavate elements of Russia’s digital
multipolarism in the resolution’s text (normative propositions advanced in the body of the
document) and context (socio-political circumstances pertaining to the original resolution’s
introduction). By locating core pillars of Russia’s digital multipolarism in the first postSoviet decade, I illuminate continuities in Russia’s approach to the global internet in order
to analytically divorce Russia’s internet governance agenda from the logics of authoritarian
politics of the Putin-era, which is currently the predominant way of understanding Russia’s
internet vision among Western scholars and media. By contrast, I demonstrate how the
cultural logics of Russian elites’ historic understanding of Russia as a great power have
underlain Russia’s quest to reinstate itself as one of the several geopolitical poles responsible
for world governance, including management of the global internet.
The choice of the United Nations as a venue for advancing the resolution signals Russian
digital multipolarism’s core view of intergovernmental fora as the main mechanism for
global decision-making. While emphasizing the UN’s centrality to the management of
global affairs, Russia since the early 1990s has advocated reforming the UN to better reflect
post-Cold War realities and to attain greater efficiency. It was explicitly in the context of
proposing such reforms to the UN that Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (1998-2004) introduced
the resolution on international information security to the UN General Assembly:
I should like to reaffirm that we support the implementation of reforms and
changes in United Nations mechanisms that will promote effective consolidation
of the United Nations and improve its activities. Among the steps taken to that end
I wish to mention adoption, under United Nations auspices, of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Russia’s initiative to launch a discussion on ways to achieve
international information security serves the same goal. In essence, our proposal is intended
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to offset threats inherent in the use of the latest advances in science and technology
for purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security (Ivanov
1998, 23; added emphasis).
Aside from Russia’s preference for an intergovernmental body as a venue for internet
governance policymaking, continuity in its digital multipolarism is exemplified by the
resolution’s focus on security and, relatedly, the fact that Russia was advancing the document
via the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Russia’s discursive
and policy emphasis on security in the context of internet governance is often seen as a
sign of the government’s authoritarian illiberal politics of the past decade (e.g., Pigman
2019). Indeed, beginning in the early 2010s, Russian officials have increasingly narrated
internet technology itself as a threat to the political regime and society (Asmolov 2015). In
2014, amid a wave of government-initiated restrictive internet regulations, Putin famously
suggested that the internet had been created as “a special CIA project” that was “still
developing as such” (Putin 2014). The primacy of security concerns within Russia’s foreign
policy imaginary, however, is not exclusive to Putin’s rule, as security issues dominated
Russia’s foreign policy agenda throughout Yeltsin’s presidency in 1991-99 (Lo 2002, 128144; Sergunin 2015, 135-153). As a self-identified great power, Russia wanted to be included
in the construction of the post-Cold War global security architecture. However, Russian
leadership felt that, contrary to its expectations in the early 1990s, the West excluded Russia
from this process. The exclusion was manifested most overtly in NATO’s plans to expand
into Eastern Europe against Russia’s vehement opposition. Driven by the intense desire for
inclusion into the security process and pursuing restoration of its global prestige, Russia
supported and initiated security arrangements outside of the US-led structures (Lo 2002,
132-134). Russia’s concern with international information security and its advancement
through the UN, then, illuminates how Russia’s great power imaginary has continuously
informed the logics of digital multipolarism.
The timing of the original resolution’s introduction provides further insight into continuities
of Russian digital multipolarism. Russia introduced the resolution to the UN General
Assembly in late September 1998, one month after the financial collapse of the Russian
economy. The cabinet of ministers that presided over the economic default resigned in
August 1998 and Primakov was promoted from foreign minister to prime minister just
over a week before the UN gathering. Remarks delivered to the UN General Assembly
by Primakov’s successor as foreign minister, Igor Ivanov pursued two goals. The first was
to assuage Western fears about Russia’s illiberal turn following the popular and political
backlash against the country’s authorities after the financial crisis. The second was to
promote the principle of multipolarity in global affairs. Ivanov bridged the two imperatives
in his speech:
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From this rostrum I pledge that Russia will not deviate from the path of reform and
will do its best to pass with dignity this most difficult test, so as not only to preserve
the democratic progress that has been made but also to augment it. Likewise,
Russia’s foreign policy will remain consistent and constructive. It is firmly geared
towards building a democratic multipolar world (Ivanov 1998, 20).
Russia rationalizes multipolarity as a more democratic form of global order as compared to
unipolarity, a system in which the US hegemon imposes its will upon others. Russia draws
on the legitimacy of democracy as a universal value in domestic governance to challenge the
global liberal order spearheaded by the West and, in Russia’s view, to the diminishment of
Russia’s role in global governance. In this case, Ivanov employs this rhetorical equation to
allege that Russia’s domestic progress toward Western liberal democracy and the nature
of multipolarity that Russia advances are “democratic” in the same way. The adverb
“likewise” connects these two propositions, further emphasizing that multipolarity in
global affairs is equivalent to liberal democracy in domestic governance in terms of its
inclusive representative nature. What Ivanov’s remarks reveal about Russia’s quest for a
multipolar order is that not only does this program precede what is generally viewed as
Russia’s authoritarian turn in the 2000s and especially 2010s, but that it coincides with
Russia’s strong commitment to liberalism professed from the main international podium.
Further, the fact that Ivanov was promoting multipolarity immediately following one of the
worst economic blows in Russia’s Post-Soviet history suggests that Russia’s advancement
of multipolarity cannot be tied solely to its growing geopolitical ambitions over the course
of the 2000s. To sum up, today’s commonplace equation of Russia’s advancement of a
multipolar digital order exclusively with the Kremlin’s authoritarianism or its growing
political-economic weight are equally ahistorical and reductive.
In addition to contextual factors outlined above, the resolution’s short text promotes digital
multipolarism through its advancement of a state-based intergovernmental vision of global
informational governance. The document frames information and telecommunication
sphere as a global public good by suggesting that it furthers the “development of
civilization,” creates opportunities for the “common good of all States,” enhances the
“creative potential of mankind,” and improves the “circulation of information in the global
community.” All of these terms – civilization, common good, all states, mankind, global
community – appeal to the sense of shared destiny that should be steered by a wide range of
actors representative of global diversity. Accordingly, since the late 1990s, Russia’s narration
of the global network has appealed to the internet’s communal origin myth to advance the
core proposition of digital mutlipolarism, i.e. that the digital status quo under the US ambit
monopolizes the technology that was meant to benefit all, and that its management needs
to be diversified. Igor Shchegolev, Minister of Communication (2008-2012) and Aide to
President (2012-2018), lamented in 2015 at the VI Safe Internet Forum held in Moscow:
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[D]e facto and de jure the global internet infrastructure and its governance are
currently monopolized and are outside of the international law.
[…] A turning point, however, is approaching. More and more people are starting
to realize that the internet in its current state doesn’t reflect the objectives, for
which it was created. It is upon us to return to the forefront the objective of
mankind’s humanitarian development (Shchegolev 2015).
Lastly, the resolution calls on the international community to employ state-based
“multilateral levels” of governance and develop legally binding “international principles”
to protect humanity’s digital progress and security. In the following two decades, Russia
has continued to promote these two governance instruments as critical to challenging the
US internet hegemony and restoring the internet to its purported original purpose. In his
address to the 2009 Russian Internet Forum, President Medvedev (2008-2012) proposed,
“the Internet should not be an environment dominated by rules set by one country alone,
even the strongest and most advanced country. There should be international rules drawn
up through collective effort, and the worldwide web should continue to develop as it has
done so far – as a common environment” (Medvedev 2009).
Russian officials’ uninterrupted framing of the internet as that of a common good and of
state-based governance mechanisms as best fitting the internet’s shared nature – as opposed
to unilateral decision-making by the US digital hegemon – illuminate continuity in Russia’s
digital multipolarism rooted in its great power self-image.

CONCLUSION
This CARGC Paper explored the cultural logics underpinning the Russian state’s agenda
to move the global internet’s governance away from the present model, which is dominated
by the US-based non-governmental organizations, toward a state-based intergovernmental
model under the auspices of the United Nations. I have argued that Russia’s approach
can be productively understood by employing Russia’s historic great power identity as the
central analytical lens. In constructing independent Russia’s identity and interests, Russian
ruling elites have drawn on the cultural repertoire of Russia as a great power. Through
this understanding, Russia sees full participation in global governance as its natural right
and seeks to restore its place among the world’s leading powers following partial loss of its
status in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The emerging US-led unipolar
liberal order of the 1990s was incongruent with Russia’s understanding of the international
system and its place in it because it limited Russia’s domestic sovereignty and its role in
shaping the global order. Consequently, Russia has advanced the normative framework
of multipolarism, centered around notions of state sovereignty and global governance via
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intergovernmental organizations and bodies, foremost the United Nations and its Security
Council. This framework has informed the logics and language of Russia’s global internet
governance agenda, which I proposed to conceptualize as digital multipolarism.

...my examination of
Russia’s advancement of
digital multipolarity in the
late 1990s, when Russia
was still proclaiming
its commitment to the
liberal-democratic path
and was considered a
democracy by the Western
community, shows this
common understanding to
be ahistorical.

Russia’s counterhegemonic critique of
the existing internet
governance system became
increasingly pronounced
precisely as Russia gained
greater ontological security
with the resurgence of
its geopolitical weight in
recent years.

Using an identity-based analytical approach to Russia’s internet governance agenda, this
paper focused on Russia’s internet policymaking in the first post-Soviet decade prior to
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. This analytically delimited timeline allowed me to illuminate
continuities in Russia’s digital vision over the past two decades and to offer a corrective to
dominant expert understandings of Russia’s challenge to the US-led digital order. By far
the most common scholarly explanation attributes Russia’s internet governance philosophy
and policy to the country’s authoritarian political system and imperialist foreign policy.
Scholars advancing this argument tend to focus on Russian politics in the 2010s, during
Russia’s illiberal turn and severe crisis in the Russia-West relations. They purport that Russia
challenges the US-led digital governance in order to bolster domestic repressions and enrich
the elites. However, my examination of Russia’s advancement of digital multipolarity in
the late 1990s, when Russia was still proclaiming its commitment to the liberal-democratic
path and was considered a democracy by the Western community, shows this common
understanding to be ahistorical. This paper’s cultural lens does not deny the corrupt and
increasingly authoritarian nature of Russia’s political system. Rather, it illuminates how
long-standing cultural self-identification and attendant tropes necessarily inform this
regime’s understanding of the national self, the global order, and digital politics.
Another common analytical framing ties Russia’s advancement of the multipolar digital
order to its relative economic resurgence since the early 2000s and its ensuing geopolitical
challenge to the US-led unipolarity. Yet, as I have shown, the multipolarity framework
emerged in the first post-Soviet decade during Russia’s prolonged socio-economic crisis that
accompanied its liberalizing market reforms. Specifically, I analyzed Russia’s policy proposal
on international information security rooted in the ethos of multipolarity, which it submitted
to the United Nations immediately after the August 1998 financial collapse. While economic
growth in the 2000s certainly afforded Russia with material capabilities to pose a greater
challenge to the liberal order, including in the arena of digital politics, digital multipolarism
clearly predates Russia’s political-economic rise.
Scholars have also recently proposed that Russia’s emphasis on sovereignty in the digital
space stems from its ontological insecurity rooted in its relative youth as a nation-state.
The implication of this approach is that the more mature and economically stable Russia
became over the post-Soviet years, the closer its stance would approximate that of the
long-established cosmopolitan states that feel safe in their sovereignty and do not feel
the need to challenge the digital status quo. Yet, the opposite has been the case: Russia’s
counter-hegemonic critique of the existing internet governance system became increasingly
pronounced precisely as Russia gained greater ontological security with the resurgence of
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its geopolitical weight in recent years. Moreover, established Western states like France and
Germany have increasingly embraced the framework of digital sovereignty and challenged
the US-led internet governance model.

...this paper’s analytical
lens points to a broader
theoretical opening in
approaching the question
of why states advance
different visions for the
global internet.

Beyond the investigation into the cultural logics of Russia’s internet governance agenda, this
paper’s analytical lens points to a broader theoretical opening in approaching the question
of why states advance different visions for the global internet. Using the case of Russia’s
challenge to the US-led digital order stemming from its great power identity, this essay
has shown how analytically centering cultural factors such as a nation’s historic identity as
expressed in political and policy discourse generates more nuanced understandings of the
logics and rhetoric behind states’ internet governance normative visions. Future research
ideally will develop a comprehensive cultural framework of internet governance to employ
for global comparative research of national internet governance agendas.
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